Applying U.S. Law to Halt Deforestation in Southeastern Myanmar: A Survey of Potential Strategies by Kelso, Douglas J.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 0 
Number 1 Intramural Issue 
5-1-1992 
Applying U.S. Law to Halt Deforestation in Southeastern 
Myanmar: A Survey of Potential Strategies 
Douglas J. Kelso 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Douglas J. Kelso, Comment, Applying U.S. Law to Halt Deforestation in Southeastern Myanmar: A Survey 
of Potential Strategies, 0 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1992). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol0/iss1/3 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright @ 1991, Douglas . Kelso
Applying U.S. Law to Halt Deforestation in
Southeastern Myanmar: A Survey of
Potential Strategies
Douglas J. Kelsot
INTRODUCTION
As the twentieth century draws to a close, the threat posed by envi-
ronmental degradation grows increasingly apparent. Climatic change,
ozone depletion, hazardous wastes, and numerous other ecological con-
cerns gain growing prominence in national and international policy
debates. Environmental degradation causes the loss of valuable atmos-
pheric, hydrological, geological, and biological resources.1 In terms of
resource depletion, the rapid destruction of tropical rain forests poses one
of the greatest ecological threats to our planet today. This paper proposes
that proper application of United States law might discourage tropical
deforestation abroad, using the nation of Myanmar (formerly Burma) as
an example.
A. The Crisis of Tropical Deforestation
Although tropical rain forests cover approximately seven percent of
the earth's surface, they contain between fifty and ninety percent of the
world's plant and animal species.2 Properly utilized, a tropical rain forest
can provide substantial economic benefits. Careful selective forestry can
yield a continuous supply of valuable hardwoods. The forest provides
food, fuel, fodder, hides, building material and other necessities for the
t B.A. 1986, Linfield College; J.D. Candidate 1992, The University of Washington.
1. The U.S. Congress has found the problems of deforestation to include wood shortages,
wetland loss, siltation of water bodies, floods, destruction of indigenous peoples, extinction of
plant and animal species, reduced food production capacity, loss of genetic resources,
desertification, and possible global climatic destabilization. See 22 USCA § 2151p-l(a) (1990).
2. Kenton R. Miller, Walter V. Reid and Charles V. Barber, Deforestation and Species
Loss, in Jessica T. Matthews, ed, Preserving the Global Environment: The Challenge of Shared
Leadership 79, 83 (Norton, 1990) ("Deforestation and Species Loss").
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populations of developing nations.3 The forest stores and filters rainfall,
providing clean drinking water, productive fisheries, and flood control. It
is also a source of valuable medicine for both industrialized and develop-
ing nations.4 Forests could potentially provide abundant export crops to
help developing countries reduce trade debts.'
Yet, throughout the tropics, deforestation has reduced large tracts of
the most biologically diverse ecosystems on earth to desert. Without the
forest to absorb rain water and hold soil in place, the land becomes vul-
nerable to erosion, resulting in mudslides, ruined fisheries and fouled
drinking water. An estimated 100 acres of rain forest vanish every
minute.6
The disappearance of biogenetic diversity through tropical deforesta-
tion is a permanent and possibly catastrophic loss to all nations.
Unknown species may hold new cures for diseases, new sources of food,
or bases for new industries. The economic loss of genetic potential
through extinction may be beyond computation.7 Some species are
endemic to only a few square miles of tropical rain forest, the destruction
of which could cause their extinction. As the loss of that forest may for-
ever eliminate a potentially valuable species from the world's gene pool,
all nations have an interest in halting tropical deforestation around the
globe.'
The causes of deforestation vary between nations. Slash-and-burn
farming and ranching are perhaps the most widespread problems.9 To
3. Id at 95.
4. Tropical plants have so far yielded medicines for Hodgkin's disease, Parkinson's disease,
multiple sclerosis, malaria, leukemia, dysentery, hypertension, heart surgery and epilepsy. John
Hemming, Exploitation Will Save the Rainforest, The Times (May 17, 1990).
5. James Brooke, Harvesting Exotic Crops To Save Brazil's Forest, NY Times A12 (Apr 30,
1990). See also Forest Sceptics, Economist 94 (May 26, 1990); John Hemming, Exploitation Will
Save the Rainforest, The Times (May 17, 1990); Michael McCabe, Marketing the Rain Forests,
San Francisco Chronicle Z21 (Oct 1, 1989).
6. Philip Shabecoff, Loss of Tropical Forests Is Found Much Worse Than Was Thought, NY
Times Al (Jun 8, 1990).
7. See Marilyn Post, The Debt-For-Nature Swap: A Long-Term Investment for the
Economic Stability of Less Developed Countries, 24 Intl Law 1071 (1990).
8. While an extinction is a global loss, the loss is felt most keenly in that nation in which
the species was found. For example, imagine that a vine indigenous to a small area of rain forest
contains a unique chemical that will cure Alzheimer's disease. Any country possessing the vine
could reap a fortune from its managed harvest. Were this vine destroyed for agriculture or
logging, humanity would lose a cure for a debilitating disease, and the country would lose a
natural resource more valuable than the crops or timber the land would otherwise produce.
9. Deforestation and Species Loss at 85 (cited in note 2). See also Janet Raloff, Unraveling
the Economics of Deforestation, 133 Science News 366 (1988); Walter B. Kleeman Jr., Furniture
Makers Ensnared in Environmental Battle, Wood & Wood Products 34 (Oct 1989).
[Intramural Issue
DEFORESTATION IN MYANMAR
prepare an area for farmland or range, an entire tract is clear-cut and
burned and the ash used to, fertilize the soil. However, the soil itself is
barren of nutrients and cannot support agriculture or grazing for more
than a few years, after which the farmers move on, clearing additional
forest to support their livelihood.
Other causes of deforestation include the cutting of trees for fire-
wood, strip-mining, flooding from hydroelectric development projects,
and timber harvest.10 In most of the world, timber harvest currently
causes little deforestation compared to other factors. However, in some
countries, vast tracts of forest are still clear-cut for tropical hardwoods,
lumber, and paper.
B. Deforestation in Myanmar
Myanmar is one nation in which tropical timber harvest causes sub-
stantial deforestation." Myanmar contains the largest remaining rain
forest in Southeast Asia. As with many tropical nations, Myanmar lost
significant forest acreage in the past; roughly 20% of Myanmar's forest
disappeared between 1960 and 1985. In the past several years, however,
the rate of deforestation in Myanmar has increased dramatically. 2 Unre-
strained logging, slash-and-burn agriculture and firewood collection have
devastated large areas of Myannar's rain forest, leaving behind more than
a million acres of denuded landscape littered with decaying logs, ashes,
and stumps.
10. Janet Raloff, Unraveling the Economics of Deforestation, 133 Science News 366 (1988);
Walter B. Kleeman Jr., Furniture Makers Ensnared in Environmental Battle, Wood & Wood
Products 34 (Oct 1989).
11. Other areas include Sarawak (in Malaysia) and parts of central Africa. Sara Oldfield,
The Tropical Chainsaw Massacre, New Scientist 54 (Sep 23, 1989).
12. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, the rate of destruction of
Myanmar's forests has increased 500% in recent years. By various estimates, Myanmar will
exhaust its usable teak reserves in five to fifteen years at present extraction rates. Out of a
conservatively estimated 1.25 million acres cut every year, only 50,000 acres are replanted.
Denis D. Gray, Last Teak Forests Disappearing as Burmese Seek Quick Profits, Seattle Times A7
(Oct 17, 1990) ("Last Teak Forests"); Philip Smucker, Thailand's Neighbor Logging Policy Hit,
Inter Press Service (July 12, 1990); Myanmar Pays More Attention to Afforestation, Xinhua News
Service (Aug 23, 1990); Charles P. Wallace, Face-Off Heats Up Over Teak in Asian Forest, Los
Angeles Times H5 (Aug 14, 1990) ("Face-Off Heats Up"); Roger Matthews, Cash-Starved
Regime Courts an Ecological Disaster, Financial Times 6 (Jun 21, 1990) ("Cash-Starved
Regime").
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Myanmar's tropical rain forest contains 80% of the world's teak
reserves.13 Teak is one of Myanmar's major exports, 14 with most of the
trade routed through Thailand. The major importers of teak are the
United States, Japan, Denmark and Italy. 5 Teak is the most valuable
hardwood in the world; a single large teak tree can be worth up to US
$75,000 on the world market.1 6 Highly prized for its strength and beauty,
teak was once the wood of choice for ship construction. Today, its pri-
mary use is in luxury items. 17
1. The Political Situation in Myanmar
Myanmar has been under isolationist, authoritarian socialist govern-
ments since gaining independence from Britain in 1948. Four decades of
mismanagement have left Myanmar one of the poorest countries in the
world, despite abundant natural resources."' Myanmar's governments
have also been noted for intense political repression. 9 In 1988, approxi-
mately 3000 civilians died when the military suppressed a popular upris-
ing of monks, students, and workers. The current military government,
13. Philip Smucker, Thailand's Neighbor Logging Policy Hit, Inter Press Service (July 12,
1990); Binod Bhattarai, Instant Cash from Teak Forests, Inter Press Service (Apr 26, 1990).
Formerly, the world's major sources of teak were India and Thailand. Overharvesting in India
has reduced some teak forests to desert, and unrestrained cutting in Thailand virtually eliminated
most of its teak by 1985. Face-OffHeats Up (cited in note 12). Small amounts of teak remain in
Thailand, Laos, Kampuchea, and Vietnam. Inferior grades of teak come from Indonesian
plantations. Last Teak Forests (cited in note 12). In addition to teak, there are other useful
woods in Myanmar's forests, but only 22 of more than 1600 wood species have been extensively
researched and given industrial applications. The United Nations and Burma 8 (U.N.
Information Centre, Rangoon, Nov 1987) ("U.N. and Burma").
14. Teak and other forest products comprise over 30% of Myanmar's export revenues.
U.N. and Burma at 8 (cited in note 13). Teak is second only to rice as the major foreign
exchange earner. Myanmar 1990: Country Presentation by the Government of the Union of
Myanmar 2 (U.N. Conference on Least Developed Countries, Paris, Sep 3-14, 1990) ("Myanmar
1990"). However, teak may now be the leading export commodity; rice exports have fallen since
the current regime took power. Economic Trends in Burma, East Asian Executive Reports 24
(Jan 15, 1990).
15. Last Teak Forests (cited at note 12).
16. Cash-Starved Regime at 6 (cited at note 12).
17. Major end uses of tropical woods include furniture, paneling, flooring, veneers,
plywood, pulpwood, knife handles, musical instruments, and lumber. Sheryl A. Barnett, Sparing
the Wood, Newsday 3 (Apr 19, 1990).
18. C. Kijang, Burma: Military Regime Boosted by Foreign Aid and Investment, Inter Press
Service (Dec 4, 1990). Myanmar's natural resources include fisheries, oil fields, mineral reserves,
the largest remaining tract of rain forest in Southeast Asia, and (as mentioned) 80% of the
world's teak reserves (see note 13 and accompanying text).
19. Shiro Yoneyama, Asia Gets Mixed U.S. Reviews on Human Rights Records, Kyodo
News Service (Feb 2, 1991). See also Philip Smucker, Burma: Human Rights Record Questioned
as Civil War Deepens, Inter Press Service (Jun 6, 1988).
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known as SLORC,2 ° came to power at that time. The crackdown
prompted the massive withdrawal of foreign aid by many governments
that had previously supported Myanmar.2 1 In May 1990, Myanmar held
an open election in which the opposition National League for Democracy
party won a landslide victory.22 SLORC responded by arresting opposi-
tion leaders and refusing to honor the election results.
23
SLORC has also continued a long civil war against several of
Myanmar's indigenous peoples, most notably the Karen in Myanmar's
southeastern forests.2 4 For years, the Karen sold teak for subsistence and
to support their struggle against the Myanmar government.25  The
Myanmar army has vigorously persecuted the Karen; government troops
have destroyed cropland, burned villages, and shot civilians on sight26 in
a struggle that has occasionally spilled over into Thailand.27
Further complicating this situation is Myanmar's illegal drug trade;
Myanmar is one of the world's leading heroin producers. Under the guise
of fighting opium warlords, Myanmar's army has driven thousands of vil-
20. SLORC: State Law and Order Restoration Council.
21. A number of nations cut off foreign aid to Myanmar as a result of the government's
response to the uprising. Japan was Myanmar's largest donor; it donated $259 million to
Myanmar in 1988, 78% of the nation's total foreign assistance, before it cut off foreign aid
following the uprising. Myanmar: What Should US. Do?, Los Angeles Times D3 (Mar 11,
1991). Other nations that provided foreign aid prior to 1988 included West Germany, Denmark,
Canada, Australia, Britain, Finland, China, Switzerland, South Korea, and Norway. Aid also
came from the Asian Development Bank, the European Economic Community, and the United
Nations. Myanmar 1990 at 12 (cited in note 14).
22. Philip Smucker, Burma: Mood of Apprehensive Uncertainty After Elections, Inter Press
Service (May 31, 1990).
23. Burma: Even Buddha Is Banned, Economist 29 (Aug 25, 1990). See also Philip
Smucker, Burma: West Moves From Confrontation to Reconciliation (Jan 23, 1991) for a
summary of the election and subsequent events. Among the imprisoned opposition leaders is
recent Nobel Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. Julian Isherwood, Nobel Prize for Burma
Opposition Leader, Daily Telegraph 1 (Oct 15, 1991).
24. The major ethnic groups in Myanmar are Burman, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon,
Rakhine, and Shan. There are also sizable Indian and Chinese communities. U.N. and Burma at
1 (cited in note 13). The Karen have been striving for decades for independence or autonomy
under a federal system. See Carol Conragan, United Press International (May 26, 1990),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The Karen struggle predates Myanmar's
independence; they had resisted British rule and sought sovereign recognition at the time of
independence.
25. The Karen are dependent on the forest for teak and other wood, bamboo, food, and
medicine. The loss of the forest is expected to devastate their culture. Sutin Wannabovorn, Thai
Loggers Fell Trees in Burma and Then Just Leave Them, Reuters (Nov 2, 1990), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. Although the Karen harvest timber, they employ selective
harvest techniques in conjunction with replanting to preserve the forest ecosystem. James
Pringle, Thai Loggers 'Rape' Burma Teak Forest, The Times (May 26, 1990) ("Thai Loggers
'Rape' Burma"); A Border Lined With Gold, Economist 31 (Apr 6, 1991).
26. Conragan, United Press International (May 26, 1990) (cited in note 24).
27. Myanmar Soldiers Allegedly Plunder Thai Village, Kyodo News Service (Jan 29, 1991).
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lagers from the forests, killing many in the process.2 8 SLORC has been
accused of ignoring heroin traffic in favor of suppressing the insurgency.2 9
2. Foreign Timber Contracts
Following the 1988 crackdown, SLORC found itself facing a number
of problems: a restive and angry population, a continuing civil war
against the Karen and other minorities, a devastated national infrastruc-
ture, and poor living standards. Myanmar's treasuryheld only US $10
million in foreign reserves.30 SLORC responded to this fiscal crisis by
opening its borders to foreign investors.
In 1989, Myanmar signed more than 200 contracts and entered into
over 150 additional joint ventures with foreign enterprises.3 These new
arrangements included oil and gas ventures, coastal fishing operations,
gem mining, and timber harvesting. In 1989, Myanmar raised $100 mil-
lion with 22 timber concessions to Thai companies,32 and by 1990, had
granted over 40 concessions.33 The concessions often went to companies
closely linked to Thai military officers and politicians.34
The timber concessions have proven environmentally catastrophic as
unrestrained clear-cutting devastates vast tracts of forest land. Thai tim-
ber companies, having found their opportunities in Thailand restricted by
28. Philip Smucker, Politics of Teak Enmeshed in War of Repression, Inter Press Service
(Apr 23, 1990).
29. Angus MacSwan, Burma Heroin Production Booms as Junta Focuses on Dissent,
Reuters (Oct 4, 1990).
30. Thai Loggers 'Rape' Burma (cited in note 25).
31. Chen Bingqi, Myanmar Makes Big Strides in Implementing Its Open-Door Economic
Policy, Xinhua News Service (Jan 3, 1990).
32. The Cost of Wood, Economist 39 (Dee 23, 1989). This figure may seem high; it
represents roughly 40% of Myanmar's export income of $250 million in 1989. However, wood
products have historically accounted for over 30% of Myanmar's exports. U.N. and Burma at 8
(cited in note 13). In Myanmar's F.Y. 1988-89, 149,000 tons of raw teak were legally exported.
In F.Y. 1989-90, this dropped to 120,000 tons. Myanmar 1990 at 27 (cited in note 14).
33. Thailand: Environmental Groups Meet With Premier on Burma Logging, Inter Press
Service (Jun 15, 1990).
34. Cash-Starved Regime at 6 (cited in note 12). Other companies from Singapore, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong harvest teak from the interior of Myanmar through joint ventures with the
Myanmar government, and the Chinese bring timber out of the northern part of the country.
Last Teak Forests (cited in note 12). See also Yuli Ismartono, Burma Cozies Up to Big Brother
Thailand, Inter Press Service (Mar 13, 1990).
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a commercial logging ban,35 are taking advantage of the chance to harvest
Myanmar's teak forests.3 6
Myanmar has ostensibly regulated forestry for decades under strict
forest practice laws.37 For example, Myanmar law nominally requires
timber companies to leave some trees standing, leave stumps behind to
throw up shoots for ground cover, and leave trees on hillsides to prevent
mudslides.3 8 In practice, timber companies ignore the regulations.
Instead, they log the forests as rapidly as possible using large-scale mecha-
nized clear-cut operations that resemble strip-mining more than for-
estry.39  Several Thai companies have also been implicated in timber
poaching and smuggling.4
If Myanmar properly enforced its forestry laws, timber-related defor-
estation would pose little problem. Myanmar publicly boasts of a well-
established forestry department, 41  although Myanmar officials have
35. The ban went into effect in early 1989 after hundreds of people died from mudslides
directly attributable to rapacious deforestation. Philip Smucker, Thailand: Will Logging Ban
Serve to Protect Rain Forests? Inter Press Service (Jan 25, 1989).
36. Apparently the timber companies recognize the instability of the current political
situation and are maximizing their harvest while they still have access to Myanmar's forests,
removing even undersized trees. See Thailand: Environmental Groups Meet With Premier on
Burma Logging, Inter Press Service (Jun 15, 1990). One problem is that each timber concession
is for a three to five year period. Burma Detains 250 Thai Loggers, Says Forests Are Being
Stripped, Reuters (Jun 27, 1990) ("Burma Detains Loggers"). Timber companies have no
incentive to replant, as they have no guarantee of being able to harvest the next generation of
timber.
37. Traditionally, Burmese loggers have employed a harvest system implemented by the
British in the 19th century known as the Burma Selection System. Under the Burma Selection
System, only the largest teak trees were cut. The trees were removed individually by elephants
with minimal damage to the surrounding forest and "seed trees" were left to help regenerate the
area. Areas were selectively cut in thirty year cycles to provide a continuous supply of teak for
world markets. See Face-OffHeats Up (cited in note 12); Last Teak Forests (cited in note 12);
Cash-Starved Regime at 6 (cited in note 12).
38. Cash-Starved Regime at 6 (cited in note 12).
39. Thai Loggers 'Rape' Burma (cited in note 25); Sutin Wannabovorn, Thai Loggers Fell
Trees in Burma and Then Just Leave Them, Reuters (Nov 2, 1990); Dianne Dumanoski, Logging
Threatening Asian Tropical Forests, Boston Globe (Jul 28, 1990).
40. Thai companies have been involved in illegal timber activities in Kampuchea, Laos and
Malaysia. Timber smuggling has often been extensive and sophisticated; in mid-1990, Myanmar
authorities shut down an operation that involved 125 Thai and 25 Myanmar timber workers,
three secret sawmills, a variety of logging equipment, and military hardware (including a mortar
and four grenade launchers). Chit Tun, Burma Cracks Down on Timber Smugglers, Drug
Runners, United Press International (Jun 29, 1990) ("Burma Cracks Down"). Insurgent groups
such as the Khmer Rouge have assisted the Thai companies in obtaining poached hardwoods.
Shiela Teift, Thai Loggers Devastate Forest, Christian Science Monitor 3 (Dec 26, 1990); Philip
Smucker, Thailand's Neighbor Logging Policy Hit, Inter Press Service (July 12, 1990).
41. Myanmar 1990 at 17 (cited in note 14).
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admitted to problems with forestry law violations.42 In December 1990,
Myanmar asked the Thai government to enter a joint venture to curb the
depredations of unregulated Thai companies. 4" Despite official warnings
and occasional arrests of loggers,' however, Myanmar has failed to make
the Thai companies comply with timber harvest laws.
3. The Military Advantages of the Teak Harvest
Although timber provides export fees that help support the
Myanmar military,45 the timber contracts are more than a source of reve-
nue for SLORC. They have proven to be a valuable strategic aid against
the Karen insurgency.46 By granting forestry concessions to Thai compa-
nies, the government prevented the Karen from earning money through
logging. The forestry concessions require timber companies to build all-
weather logging roads that will accommodate the military vehicles of the
Myanmar army.47 Clear-cutting has also stripped away the forest cover
that provided the Karen with places to hide.
The impoverished Karen have reacted to the pressure in several
ways. Some have demanded fees from Thai loggers.48 Others have
reportedly met timber extraction with violent resistance.49 To protect
timber operations against raids, some companies have paid guerilla
groups such as the Kampuchean Khmer Rouge to provide armed protec-
tion for their logging operations.50
42. Burma Rejects Environmentalist Charges of Forest Destruction, United Press
International (Jun 26, 1990). See also Burma Cracks Down (cited in note 40).
43. Steven Erlanger, Burmese Teak Forest Falls to Finance a War, NY Times A6 (Dec 9,
1990).
44. Burma Detains Loggers (cited at note 36).
45. The military received a 15% budget increase in 1990. Binod Bhattarai, Instant Cash
from Teak Forests, Inter Press Service (Apr 26, 1990).
46. Myanmar officials have admitted privately that Myanmar granted timber concessions
to Thailand primarily to gain control over the sensitive border region currently dominated by the
Karen. Id.
47. A Border Lined With Gold, Economist 31 (Apr 6, 1991).
48. Face-OffHeats Up (cited in note 12).
49. Thai Timber Company's Bowser Destroyed by Myanmar Insurgents, Xinhua News
Service (Jan 13, 1991); Thai National Security Council to Meet on Threats from Myanmar Ethnic
Groups, Xinhua News Service (Jan 14, 1991); Philip Smucker, Politics of Teak Enmeshed in War
of Repression, Inter Press Service (Apr 23, 1990).
50. Philip Smucker, Thailand's Neighbor Logging Policy Hit, Inter Press Service (Jul 12,
1990).
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C. The Role of International Action
As the rapid deforestation in southeastern Myanmar is confined
within Myanmar's borders, only Myanmar's government may stop it.
SLORC could cancel the timber contracts and expel timber companies or
use teak revenues to hire foresters to enforce forestry laws. As long as the
insurgency continues, however, SLORC's desire for immediate cash and
military advantage will probably override Myanmar's long-term need for
resource preservation. The civil war may last until indigenous minorities
such as the Karen either receive some measure of independence or are
completely defeated.
While SLORC currently maintains sovereign control within
Myanmar, other nations might attempt to influence Myanmar to halt its
rapid timber sales and discourage deforestation. Although Myanmar will
ultimately suffer the most from its deforestation, other nations will also be
harmed. 51
This Comment surveys possible strategies by which the United States
government, using existing law, might act to halt the rapid destruction of
Myanmar's tropical rain forests.
I. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Nations commonly use economic sanctions to express displeasure
and to force governmental policy changes. A government imposes eco-
nomic sanctions in the hope that loss of capital, goods, or market access
will persuade the targeted foreign government to behave as desired. This
section will evaluate sanctions the United States could apply against
Myanmar and their probability of success in halting deforestation. Direct
economic pressures on Thailand will also be considered.
A. Economic Sanctions as a Political Strategy
Economic sanctions can severely damage international relations.
Sanctions typically spur resentment, anger, and economic retaliation. A
backlash is particularly likely when one country seeks to induce a change
in what has traditionally been another country's sovereign concern, such
as the exploitation of domestic natural resources. Any nation desiring
positive relations with another should seek alternatives to sanctions.
51. See notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
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However, if the United States determines economic sanctions against
Myanmar are appropriate, the sanctions should be designed to ultimately
preserve the teak trade. Treating forests as economic assets to be utilized
and not destroyed will best serve forest preservation,5 2 so Myanmar
should be allowed to exploit its forest resources to the greatest degree that
is ecologically sound.53 The aim of economic or diplomatic pressures
should not be to destroy the teak trade but to end destructive logging and
promote sustainable harvest practices. The United States should lift sanc-
tions once Myanmar has begun reforestation and implemented proper
timber management.
Any United States sanctions on Myanmar would require multilateral
participation to be effective. Persuading other nations to cooperate would
probably be difficult; past attempts to isolate Myanmar internationally
with economic sanctions have failed, largely because of Myanmar's close
trading relationships with Thailand and China. Most of Myanmar's for-
eign trade passes through China, a nation unlikely to join a boycott of
Myanmar.14 Myanmar's strong nationalistic and isolationist tendencies
may thwart external efforts to induce reform, particularly through coer-
cive economic pressure. SLORC has previously shown strong resistance
to outside interference. 55
52. See, for example, Michael Cross, Spare the Tree and Spoil the Forest, New Scientist 24
(Nov 26, 1988). A common protection strategy in the developed world is to maintain national
parks or nature preserves that are off-limits to exploitation. However, wilderness and park
reserves lock off sometimes vital resources in poorer nations and are constantly raided. A more
realistic approach is to limit exploitation to sustainable levels. Increasingly, conservation
biologists believe that national parks are not the solution in the developing world, as many of
these parks exist only on paper and are poached, logged, farmed and mined in practice. See
William Booth, Saving Rain Forests By Using Them, Washington Post Al (Jun 29, 1989).
53. One proposed management system involves the use of "extractive reserves." An
extractive reserve is an area of forest set aside for sustainable resource collection. The area may
supply food, medicinal plants, gums, fibers, dyes, oils and other products for marketing locally
and abroad. Within an extractive reserve, mechanized logging and road construction could be
banned, making limited selective cutting a practical timber harvest technique. Local processing
plants and cottage industries can turn forest products into finished goods, providing jobs with a
stable resource base. Several studies have shown that extractive activities can be more profitable
than ranching or logging in the rainforest. Nina Broner Worcman, Brazil's Thriving
Environmental Movement, Technology Review 42 (Oct 1990). See also John Hemming,
Exploitation Will Save the Rainforest, The Times (May 17, 1990).
54. Philip Smucker, Burma: West Moves From Confrontation to Reconciliation, Inter Press
Service (Jan 23, 1991).
55. Myanmar has steadfastly refused to join ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations), SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), or any similar
organization. In a press conference, the SLORC Information Committee reiterated Myanmar's
prior policy, stating that interference in internal affairs by outsiders was unwarranted and that
"we have never interfered in the affairs of others and we expect the others to reciprocate." Press
Conference by SL OR C Information Committee, Minister for Agriculture and Forests, Minister for
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Thailand provides an alternative target for economic sanctions.
Thailand has a thriving export industry in finished teak products that
relies heavily on Myanmar's teak. The United States could impose sanc-
tions on Thailand until the Thai government requires timber companies
under its control to practice responsible forestry. For example, the
United States could pressure Thailand to restrict timber imports and con-
trol the timber industry within Thai borders.
B. Foreign Aid Moratorium
Many observers approved when the United States and other nations
cut off foreign aid to Myanmar in response to the 1988 crackdown.
56
Some would argue that the U.S. should maintain a moratorium on aid to
Myanmar until SLORC reforms domestic forestry policies.57 However,
the termination of foreign aid may have aggravated the problem by
prompting SLORC to sell Myanmar's forest resources to private enter-
prise to raise capital.
The United States is also applying economic pressure on Thailand,
although the reasons are unrelated to forestry; the U.S. eliminated all eco-
nomic and military aid to Thailand following a military coup in February
1991.58 Even before withdrawing foreign aid, however, the U.S. provided
Thailand with minimal financial support.5 9 Continuing to withhold aid
would have a minimal impact on Thailand's economy and might
encourage wasteful resource consumption.
C. Embargo
One of the most direct forms of economic pressure is a partial or
total import ban on commodities from a given nation. As deforestation in
Trade and Planning, Burma Broadcasting System (Oct 5, 1990); reported by British
Broadcasting Corporation (Oct 8, 1990).
56. Since the 1988 uprising, the United States has cut off $12 million in aid, suspended
favorable tariff treatment, and opposed loans to Myanmar from the International Monetary
Fund and other organizations.
57. Recent U.S. policy has focused on withholding aid from Myanmar pending human
rights reforms (see notes 67-69 and accompanying text).
58. Thailand: U.S. Cuts Aid After Coup, Inter Press Service (Feb 25, 1991). The United
States is unlikely to restore aid until a democratically elected government replaces the leaders
installed following the coup. United States Hopes for Early Election in Thailand, Reuters (Jul 29,
1991).
59. In 1990, Thailand received $16,400,000. Philip Smucker, Thailand: Coup Shifts
Foreign Policy, But Business Not Affected, Inter Press Service (Feb 26, 1991); Japan Unlikely to
Halt Aid to Thailand Despite Coup, Kyodo News Service (Feb 24, 1991). Against the potential
revenues from hardwood exports, this sum is minimal.
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Myanmar occurs primarily because of the large profits attainable from
teak and other hardwoods, a ban on Myanmar hardwoods would almost
certainly depress the market for Myanmar's timber products. If the
United States, as one of the major purchasers of teak,' were to ban teak
imports within its jurisdiction, the overall market value of teak would fall.
Because other markets exist for teak, a U.S. ban on teak would prob-
ably not destroy the profitability of the teak trade. The United States
might therefore attempt to spearhead a drive to halt hardwood exports
around the world. A global teak embargo would have a more drastic
impact on the teak market than a country-specific ban but would be more
difficult to implement. Other trade moratoria have met with varying suc-
cess; among them are bans on rhinoceros horn and elephant ivory.
Attempts to halt the rhino horn trade through prohibition have met
with disheartening failure.61 The ban on elephant ivory, however, has
slowed the overall rate of elephant poaching.62 Arguably, the ivory ban
has been successful if viewed as a temporary measure allowing elephant
populations to recover while management plans are developed to use the
herds profitably in a sustainable manner.6" Similarly, a teak ban should
be no more than a temporary action to halt clear-cutting pending develop-
ment and implementation of responsible harvest techniques.
Teak is used today in construction and as an ornamental wood. Sub-
stitute materials exist for both purposes; unlike rhino horn, teak has no
60. See note 16 and accompanying text.
61. Illicit trade in rhino horn primarily serves two inelastic markets: Yemen, where it is
used for dagger handles, and China, where it is used for traditional medicines. Neither market is
susceptible to international pressure. Forcing rhino horn onto the black market has raised the
price of the horn, contributing to the slaughter of additional thousands of rhinos by profit-driven
poachers. Virginia Morell, Running for Their Lives, Intl Wildlife 4, 13 (May-Jun 1990). The
demand for the horn is so great that valuable Chinese rhino horn carvings have been ground to
powder for medicinal use. Chinese Poaching Ming Artifacts for More Rhino Horns, Chicago
Tribune 4C (Oct 2, 1990).
62. Poaching roughly halved the world elephant population in the 1980s. In central
African nations, the rate of poaching has declined dramatically following the ban, and the black
market price of ivory has fallen more than 90%. See Charles Clover, End of Ivory Ban 'Will
Threaten Elephants,'Daily Telegraph 23 (Feb 14, 1991); The Ivory Paradox, Economist 16 (Mar
2, 1991). However, in southern Africa, poaching may have increased since the ban; nations in
that region had previously managed elephant herds for the ivory and maintained stable
populations. Without a legal market for ivory, there is no motivation to protect elephants from
poachers. See Elephants: Poachers' Pause, Economist 42 (Mar 2, 1991); Cris Chinaka, Five
African States to Sign Ivory Trade Treaty, Reuters (Jan 16, 1991).
63. The Ivory Paradox, Economist 16 (Mar 2, 1991); Elephants: Poachers' Pause,
Economist 42 (Mar 2, 1991). An effective plan might involve continent-wide implementation of
herd management techniques successfully employed in southern African states.
[Intramural Issue
DEFORESTATION IN MYANMAR
end consumer who feels the need to have teak at all costs." While an
international ban on teak furniture and other items may not eliminate the
global demand for teak, it could restrict the trade to a small black market.
Reducing the demand for teak would lower the incentive for timber com-
panies to harvest the wood and possibly reduce the motivation to clear-
cut.
The United States might also impose a broader embargo. A ban on
all Southeast Asian teak or all hardwoods would be more easily enforcea-
ble than a ban on Myanmar teak." The U.S. should carefully evaluate
the consequences of even a temporary general embargo. Although a gen-
eral teak ban could deprive Myanmar of a valuable export commodity
until sensible harvest practices were in place, it would also cause serious
economic harm to all Southeast Asian timber workers, including those in
nations that practice renewable timber management. Further, it may
become comparatively more profitable to clear rain forest for such
"higher" economic uses as farming or rangeland if an embargo lowered
the value of timber.6 If a hardwood ban went into effect, the industrial-
ized world and multilateral banks should help Southeast Asian nations
develop sustainable and profitable forest resource management.
The United States could impose an embargo in one of several ways,
discussed below. First, Congress could pass specific legislation to ban the
import of teak. Second, in the absence of congressional action, the execu-
tive branch could halt the flow of teak into the United States by acting
under present laws. The executive branch could employ an existing con-
gressional directive to impose sanctions on Myanmar or could act under
laws designed to protect endangered species, either by declaring teak an
endangered species or by using another species as a surrogate to invoke
key provisions of the United States Endangered Species Act.
64. Hardwoods such as rosewood or mahogany could be used in place of teak in luxury
goods. Softwoods, brick, clay, metal, glass, or other materials may be used in construction.
Some hardwoods are used wastefully for disposable goods that might be made from plastic or
fiber plants such as flax. Use of substitute materials would provide more hardwood for consumer
durables and luxury items.
65. A ban on teak might have to include plantation stock and wild timber taken through
sustainable forestry, since legal and illegal teak may be indistinguishable. Wild teak harvested in
Myanmar could be slipped in among plantation teak, for example.
66. Jonathan Thatcher, Southeast Asia Needs Help to Keep Its Forests, Reuters (Sep 3,
1989).
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1. Direct Ban on Myanmar Imports
The United States Congress, as part of the Customs and Trade Act of
1990,67 has authorized the president to impose sanctions against
Myanmar until the Myanmar government ends specified political and
human rights abuses.68 To date, the president has failed to act. Although
a halt to deforestation is not a listed condition, the president has the dis-
cretion to block the import of all Myanmar goods, including tropical tim-
ber, while political abuses continue. The law also calls upon the president
to seek cooperative agreements with other industrial democracies, which
include Italy, Denmark, and Japan. The president could thus place a ban
on all teak coming from Myanmar and ask other teak importers to do the
same.
The president's authority to impose sanctions under this bill will con-
tinue until SLORC has taken specified steps to fight the drug trade, lifted
martial law, freed all political prisoners, and abdicated power to a civilian
69government. Once Myanmar has met the listed conditions, the United
States might be able to work more effectively with the next government.
Although a teak embargo under the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 must
be lifted at that point, the temporary disruption of the teak trade would
still provide disincentives to continue logging at current levels.70
2. Endangered Species Protection
Another approach to halting the import of teak into the United
States would be to use endangered species protection laws. The executive
67. Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-382, 104 Stat 629-726.
68. Pub L No 101-382, § 138, 104 Stat 653 (1990) (Economic Sanctions Against Products
of Burma): "If the President does not certify to Congress that Myanmar has implemented
specified political reforms by October 1, 1990, then he shall impose economic sanctions upon
Myanmar as he deems appropriate. He shall also attempt to persuade other industrialized
democracies to cooperate in sanctions against Myanmar. In imposing sanctions, the President
shall give primary consideration to those products (including tropical timber) which constitute
major imports from Myanmar, unless he determines that sanctions against those products would
adversely affect U.S. economic interests. If the President fails to impose sanctions, he shall
report his reasons for not doing so to Congress." Senator Daniel Moynihan introduced this bill
largely to address Myanmar's human rights violations, but with support by environmentalists as
well. See Burma Detains 250 Thai Loggers, Says Forests Are Being Stripped, Reuters (Jun 27,
1990); Binod Bhattarai, Instant Cash from Teak Forests, Inter Press Service (Apr 26, 1990).
69. Pub L No 101-382 § 138(b).
70. Congress could similarly ban all imported hardwood from any nation and create an
exception for states using logging methods certified as "ecologically sensitive" by the U.S. State
Department. This would resemble the current system of State Department certifications for
human rights violations.
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branch might declare teak to be an endangered species and ban its
exploitation and import.
a. The Endangered Species Act
In the United States, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) mandates
substantial protection for plants and animals listed as endangered.
7 1 Sec-
tion 9 of the ESA bans the import of any endangered plant species into
the United States72 or its transport in interstate or foreign commerce.
73
This law applies to any person, corporation, or government entity within
the jurisdiction of the United States. 74
Section 7 of the ESA places upon every federal agency an affirmative
duty to develop programs for threatened and endangered species conser-
vation.75 This language is not qualified by economic efficiency or political
expediency; 76 all agencies of the federal government must act to protect
and promote the recovery of listed species.7 7
i. Placing teak on the endangered species list. The Secretary of the
Interior could add teak to the endangered species list.78 A species must
face the risk of extinction over all or a "significant portion" of its geo-
71. 16 USC §§ 1531-1544 (1988 and Supp 1989).
72. 16 USC § 1538(a)(2)(A).
73. 16 USC § 1538(a)(2)(C).
74. 16 USC § 1538(a)(2).
75. 16 USC § 1536(a)(1). "Conservation" encompasses all methods and procedures
necessary to bring an endangered species to the point where it is no longer endangered. 16 USC
§ 1532(3).
76. However, designating a "critical habitat" under the ESA requires an analysis of
economic impact. 16 USC § 1533(b)(2). Therefore, economics need not be considered in the
listing process, but must be taken into account in selecting options for protecting the species. For
a discussion of the critical habitat issue, see Mark Bonnett and Kurt Zimmerman, Politics and
Preservation: The Endangered Species Act and the Northern Spotted Owl, 18 Ecol L Q 105, 146-
52 (1991) ("Bonnett and Zimmerman").
77. Beyond refraining from jeopardizing or destroying a species, all federal agencies must
continuously develop programs to bring rare plants and animals to the point where they may be
removed from the list of threatened or endangered species. Thomas France and Jack Tuholske,
Stay the Hand: New Directions for the Endangered Species Act, 7 Pub Land L Rev 1 (1986). The
Supreme Court has noted that the "plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt
and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost." Tennessee Valley Authority v
Hill, 437 US 153, 184 (1978).
78. 16 USC § 1533(a)(1) states that a species may be listed as endangered or threatened if it
is now or will foreseeably become in danger of extinction through any of the following factors:
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C) disease
or predation; (D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (E) other natural or
manmade factors affecting its continued existence. Most of the world's remaining teak is in
Myanmar's forests, which are being rapidly clear-cut. Myanmar's lax enforcement of its existing
laws would seem to meet the ESA's listing requirements if teak is actually facing extinction.
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graphic range to be listed.79 Thus, to list teak as endangered, the Secre-
tary would have to determine that the southeastern region of Myanmar
constitutes a "significant portion" of the species' range and that the tree
was in danger of extinction. As teak is being slowly replanted, extinction
seems a remote possibility even within Myanmar. Therefore, an ESA list-
ing protecting teak is unlikely.
ii. The use of surrogates under the ESA. It may be possible, how-
ever, to invoke the Endangered Species Act to ban teak imports without
declaring teak to be an endangered species. An ESA listing requires a
"critical habitat" designation, 0 which means an endangered species may
act as a "surrogate" to protect an entire ecosystem. 1
A number of listed endangered species are indigenous to Myanmar. 82
As Myanmar is the last major undisturbed refuge for hombills, tapirs,
rhinoceroses, and wild elephants in Southeast Asia,83 protection of
Myanmar's rain forest ecosystem may be critical to the survival of these
species. Because deforestation in the region is due largely to teak harvest
operations, protection of these species requires an end to clear-cutting.
The Secretary of the Interior has the power under the ESA to ban the
import of all products made with Myanmar hardwoods until clear-cutting
has stopped.
b. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
The United States might also request that teak be declared endan-
gered under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies (CITES).84 CITES attempts to protect endangered species by
79. 16 USC § 1532(6).
80. The designation of a species' critical habitat must be made concurrently with its listing
but may be periodically revised. 16 USC § 1533(a)(3).
81. Notable surrogates in recent years have included the northern spotted owl (used to
block clear-cutting on federal lands in the Pacific Northwest; see Bonnett and Zimmerman at 105
(cited in note 76)) and the snail darter (used to halt construction of the Tellico Dam; see
Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill, 437 US 153 (1978)). In each case, the substantive protection of
the ESA has been used to compel protection of one species while "incidentally" bringing about
another desired result.
82. Recognized endangered species in the area include Asian elephants, Asian tapirs,
Bengal monitor lizards, brown eared pheasants, clouded leopards, various gibbons, Javan and
Sumatran rhinoceroses, leopards, marbled cats, musk deer, river terrapins, Temminck's golden
cats, tigers, and white-winged wood ducks. See Endangered Species List, 50 CFR § 17.11 (1990).
83. Dianne Dumanoski, Logging Threatening Asian Tropical Forests, Boston Globe 3 (Jul
28, 1990).
84. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora,
[1976] 27 UST 1087, TIAS No 8249 ("CITES") is a multilateral convention that went into force
in 1975. Most major participants in the international teak trade-Denmark, Italy, Japan,
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regulating international trade through a system of export and import per-
mits. CITES is the only global treaty that explicitly protects plants.85
The Convention calls upon signatories to use domestic law to restrict
trade in species listed in the CITES appendices.86 CITES does not apply
to trade occurring wholly within national borders, but only to interna-
tional wildlife trade.
Under CITES, "species" includes "any species, subspecies, or geo-
graphically separate population thereof."87 The CITES appendices list
protected species. Appendix I of CITES lists species believed threatened
with extinction.88 The Convention allows only noncommercial trade in
wild plants of these species and requires permits from both the importing
and exporting states.89 Appendix II of CITES lists species that may
become threatened without adequate trade regulation.9" Exporting coun-
tries may issue commercial trade permits for Appendix II species after
determining that trade will not harm wild populations. 9'
The United States may have the best implementing infrastructure of
any CITES signatory,92 but can inspect only a fraction of the wildlife
shipments that enter the country.93 There is a particularly serious
enforcement problem with imports of protected plant species.94
Thailand, and the United States-are party to CITES. Myanmar, however, is not a signatory.
US Department of State, Treaties in Force 295 (1990).
85. See Faith Campbell, Legal Protection for Plants in the United States, 6 Pace Envir L
Rev 1, 2 (1988). The CITES appendices now include over 40,000 species of plants, the majority
being orchids. CITES, Art VII(4) provides that Appendix I plants be treated as Appendix II
species if artificially propagated for commercial purposes, so trade in plantation timber would
not be halted.
86. CITES requires each member state to appoint one or more "scientific authorities" to
monitor the status of listed species and one or more "management authorities" to regulate
permits for the import and export of listed species. CITES, Art IX. In the United States, the
Secretary of the Interior acts in both capacities. CITES is incorporated into the Endangered
Species Act at 16 USC § 1537a (1988). In some countries, no authorities were responsible for
wildlife management prior to CITES. Laura H. Kosloff and Mark C. Trexler, The Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species: Enforcement Theory and Practice in the United
States, 5 BU Intl L J 327, 334 (1987).
87. CITES, Art I(a). Because it is "geographically separated" from Indonesia's teak
plantations or from scattered stands elsewhere in Asia, Myanmar's teak could fit into this
category.
88. CITES at 1119-31.
89. CITES, Art III.
90. CITES at 1134-43.
91. CITES, Art IV.
92. Kosloff and Trexler, 5 BU Intl L J at 329 (cited in note 86).
93. Id at 344.
94. Cycads, for example, are highly prized by an international collectors' market, and
eighty out of ninety-six known taxa are threatened with extinction in the wild. Cacti are also
desired by collectors and are often traded in violation of CITES. Smuggling is only one problem,
however. Plants imported in violation of CITES often slide through customs unnoticed or
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CITES allows any party to the treaty to enter "reservations" on any
listed species upon entering the Convention95 or within ninety days after a
species is listed by amendment to Appendices I or 11.96 The Convention
treats a party entering a reservation as a nonparty for purposes of trade in
that species or its parts or derivatives.97 A reservation permits a CITES
party to engage freely in trade with nonparty states or with CITES signa-
tories that have also entered a reservation on the species. Thus, a party
need only enter a reservation to avoid CITES restrictions.98
In addition to creating the reservations loophole, the Convention
also declines to regulate imports from non-party states. A CITES signa-
tory may accept from a nation documentation that substantially conforms
to CITES permit requirements. In other words, management authorities
in Myanmar (as the original exporter) and Thailand (as the reexporter)
could both falsely certify that the specimen was obtained in compliance
with domestic law and fear little challenge from other CITES parties.
In short, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies offers little or no protection for Myanmar's forests. Even if Myanmar
were a party to CITES and teak were listed in the CITES appendices, any
party could enter a reservation and continue the trade. Moreover,
because CITES addresses only international trade and not domestic pro-
tective measures, a surrogate species listing under CITES cannot protect
an entire ecosystem.
The use of endangered species protection law shows promise, but
teak could probably not be listed as an endangered species under either
the U.S. Endangered Species Act or CITES. Instead, any efforts to block
ignored. In a test conducted by the World Wildlife Fund, U.S. customs officials asked no
questions about the open import of cacti or orchids, although virtually all species of these plants
are CITES-listed. Cactus specimens were confiscated only for health reasons. John B. Heppes
and Eric J. McFadden, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora. Improving the Prospects for Preserving Our Biological Heritage, 5 BU Intl L J
229, 239 (1987). See also Faith Campbell, Legal Protection for Plants, 6 Pace Envir L Rev 1, 11
(1988).
95. CITES, Art XXIII(2).
96. CITES, Art XV provides for amendments.
97. CITES, Art XXIII.
98. Thailand would likely enter a reservation on teak. The wood and timber industries in
Thailand are influential, with many military and government officials possessing substantial
interests in timber operations. Roger Matthews, Cash-Starved Regime Courts an Ecological
Disaster, Financial Times 6 (Jun 21, 1990). Teak importing nations such as Japan might also
enter reservations. Japan's CITES enforcement has been inconsistent, and Japan has entered
more reservations than any other nation. Japanese customs officials have permitted importation
of such products as tortoise shell and ivory taken in violation of the laws of the source countries
and often ignore CITES provisions on proper documentation. Eric McFadden, Asian
Compliance with CITES: Problems and Prospects, 5 BU Intl L J 311, 313-15 (1987).
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the import of Myanmar teak into the U.S. through endangered species
law would probably require the use of one or more endangered surrogate
species. This way, the United States could ban teak imports so long as the
teak harvest contributed substantially to habitat destruction within the
"critical habitat" of the listed species.
D. The Proper Role of Sanctions
Should the United States attempt to impose sanctions under domes-
tic and international law? The threat of economic sanctions might well
motivate a nation to halt deforestation. However, application of sanctions
against Myanmar may not be a useful policy. Other nations are unlikely
to participate significantly in organized sanctions. SLORC would
strongly resist outside pressure, and the United States exercises very little
influence on the Myanmar government at this time. Although the United
States might push Thailand into acting through economic threats, Thai-
land has only limited influence over deforestation within Myanmar.
Brash action by the United States might seriously impair U.S.-Thai rela-
tions and strengthen resistance to environmental reforms. Given the lim-
ited probable effect of available economic sanctions and the strong
potential for undesirable backlash, the United States should consider
sanctions only as a last resort.
II. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
Instead of employing economic pressures to force a policy change,
the United States might instead offer economic incentives to encourage
forest protection. Renewed ties with Myanmar could provide the United
States with an opportunity to work with the regime to promote such
desired reforms as ending the conflict with the Karen. So long as rela-
tions with SLORC remain poor, the United States can expect to have
little voice in Myanmar's affairs.
A. Foreign Aid Restoration
The United States should consider resuming aid to Myanmar, possi-
bly conditioned on peace talks, forestry reforms, or both. Given sufficient
aid, SLORC might be less willing to sacrifice national resources for fast
income. Myanmar may require substantial assistance to match the
income currently received from timber sales.
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The West has recently become more conciliatory, making renewed
aid to Myanmar more politically feasible. Western diplomats have recog-
nized that a confrontational posture has only hardened SLORC's resolve
to stay in power.99 Other governments have been mending relations with
Myanmar as well. China was the first neighbor to resume trade. Austra-
lia has resumed trade talks and foreign aid. In 1989, Japan recognized
SLORC and has begun to restore foreign aid.I" °
Foreign aid is often extended to developing nations in the form of
grants or loans for economic development. Unfortunately, developmental
aid frequently supports large, poorly conceived industrial or construction
projects." The United States should carefully design loans or grants to
Myanmar to promote sustainable economic development of the rain
forests.
The United States might specifically condition aid on the implemen-
tation of forest protection measures: Myanmar would have to protect
large tracts of forest as nature preserves or extractive reserves in return
for developmental support. The aid might then go to industries that use
non-timber forest resources in a sustainable manner. Although recent
studies show that a forest is more valuable if maintained instead of clear-
cut,102 a massive demonstration project or widespread education may be
99. Philip Smucker, Burma: West Moves From Confrontation to Reconciliation, Inter Press
Service (Jan 23, 1991).
100. C. Kijang, Burma: Military Regime Boosted by Foreign Aid and Investment, Inter
Press Service (Dec 4, 1990).
101. Brazil provides notorious demonstrations of poor planning. The construction of a
highway across the Amazon, for example, largely transformed the state of Rondonia into one of
the most deforested areas in the Amazon rainforest. Nina Broner Worcman, Brazil's Thriving
Environmental Movement, Technology Review 42 (Oct 1990). Brazil also borrowed over US $30
billion to build a series of unneeded hydroelectric dams that caused the flooding of vast areas of
rain forest. Patricia Adams, Saving Forests-With Debt, World Press Review 47 (Oct 1989).
102. Janet Raloff, Unraveling the Economics of Deforestation, 133 Science News 366 (June
4, 1988), (citing the Repetto study, World Resources Institute, The Forest for the Trees?
Government Policies and the Misuse of Forest Resources). See also Hit and Run in Sarawak, New
Scientist 49 (May 12, 1990); Rodney Tasker, Losing Nature's Cures, Far Eastern Economic
Review 48 (Apr 28, 1988).
Exploiting all potential products of the rain forest (timber, wildlife, medicines, ornamental
plants, etc.) in a sustainable manner provides greater long-term economic gain than large-scale
timber harvest. For example, a study of a large patch of Peruvian rain forest revealed that one
hectare of forest was worth $6,820 if used only for herbs, fruits, nuts, latex, and other renewable
resources. In neighboring Brazil, a tree plantation of the same size was valued at $3,184, or less
than half the value of the natural forest. The value from cattle grazing was even less: $2,960.
These dollar amounts reflected the estimated cumulative values of all future harvests for 50 years
but were calculated as current values (much as a financial manager would determine the value of
a long-term bond). Based on plant inventories, collection and transportation costs, and market
prices, the study determined that the plot produced roughly $400 worth of fruit and $22 worth of
rubber per year. If some of the 60 commercial hardwood trees found on the site were also
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needed to display the economic value of an intact rain forest to a develop-
ing nation.
B. Debt-for-Nature Exchanges
In recent years, conservation organizations have adopted a practice
of redeeming portions of a developing nation's foreign debt in exchange
for a guarantee that the nation will fund forest protection.10 3 This gener-
ally involves purchasing a portion of that nation's debt from the lender at
a discount and redeeming the debt in local currency for conservation pur-
poses. This can be a cost-effective method of conservation, as debts may
be purchased for as little as twenty percent of face value. " Each dollar
paid toward the debt can thus provide several dollars' worth of conserva-
tion efforts, such as establishing and protecting forest preserves."15
Arranging a debt-for-nature exchange is a complicated process.
106
The sponsoring party, typically a conservation organization, must obtain
the cooperation of public and private bodies that are often located in sev-
eral nations. The sponsor must then locate the debt and go through an
often complicated transfer of title to assume the debt. Most important,
the sponsor must locate an effective conservation organization within the
debtor country to ensure proper use of funds obtained by the exchange.
Although a conservation organization normally needs to take the
lead in a debt-for-nature exchange, the United States government can par-
ticipate in such a plan. Congress has called upon the United States' exec-
utive directors of multinational development banks 10 7 to negotiate for
departments in each bank to promote debt-for-nature exchanges and
selectively cut and sold, another $310 could be generated every 20 years. Harvesting all the trees
on that plot at once would generate a one-time gain of about $1,000, but would render the land
nearly useless for future production. William Booth, Saving Rain Forests By Using Them,
Washington Post Al (Jun 29, 1989).
103. For a general discussion of debt-for nature exchanges, see Comment, Debt-For-Nature
Swaps, Assessing the Future, 6 J Contemp Health L and Pol 319 (1990); Marilyn Post, The Debt-
for-Nature Swap: A Long-Term Investment for the Economic Stability of Less Developed
Countries, 24 Intl Law 1071 (1990).
104. Comment, Debt-For-Nature Swaps, Assessing the Future, 6 J Contemp Health L & Pol
319, 328-334 (1990).
105. A variation on the debt-for-nature exchange would be to trade debt forgiveness for the
cancellation of timber concessions. For example, if SLORC revoked $1 million worth of timber
concessions, Myanmar might gain $1.5 million in forgiven debt.
106. See Comment, 6 J Contemp Health L & Pol at 321-23 (cited in note 104).
107. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International
Development Association, the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development
Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.
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other resource conservation strategies.1 0 8 Additionally, the Agency for
International Development ("AID") may help nongovernmental organi-
zations purchase the discounted commercial debts of eligible nations to
support conservation projects. AID support for debt-for-nature
exchanges is available to finance the protection of oceans, the atmosphere,
and wildlife, as well as the establishment of parks, reserves, local conser-
vation projects, and land and resource management programs.' 0 9 An eli-
gible nation must fully commit to the proposed project's long-term
viability and be able to oversee the project. 1 0
The AID could support a variety of projects to protect Myanmar's
forests. For example, a conservation organization might use debt-for-
nature exchanges to help Myanmar establish additional nature reserves
and wildlife parks.' An exchange might fund research into timber man-
agement techniques having less serious environmental impacts than large-
scale clear-cuts. 12 A nongovernmental organization might also develop a
system to monitor and swiftly report timber law violations, a valuable
contribution so long as the Myanmar authorities take action against viola-
tors. A debt-for-nature exchange could help fund immediate replanting
of clear-cut areas,113 as the timber companies have been lax about replant-
ing to date.
Myanmar's foreign debt of roughly $4.2 billion'1 4 may seem small in
relation to the debts of other developing countries, but it represents a
large share of Myanmar's economy. Myanmar's budget was $11 billion in
1991115 with annual service payments on its debt exceeding $200 mil-
108. 22 USC § 262p-4c (1988).
109. See 22 USC § 2281 (Supp 1989). Congress has authorized supporting debt-for-nature
exchanges for a variety of activities, listed at 22 USC § 2283 (Supp 1989).
110. 22 USC § 2284 (Supp 1989).
111. As permitted at 22 USCA §2283(a)(3). Myanmar currently has 17 wildlife
sanctuaries and parks. Three Wildlife Parks Established in Myanmar, Xinhua News Service (Jan
24, 1991). The funds might also be used to establish extractive reserves.
112. The development of sound systems of resource management is permitted by 22 USC
§ 2283(a)(4).
113. The promotion of regenerative approaches to forestry is allowed by 22 USC
§ 2283(a)(9).
114. Press Conference by SLORC Information Committee, Minister for Agriculture and
Forests, Minister for Trade and Planning, Burma Broadcasting System (Oct 5, 1990); reported by
British Broadcasting Corporation (Oct 8, 1990). Myanmar's major national lenders are Japan,
Germany, France, and Denmark, and the main multilateral lenders are the IBRD/IDA and the
Asian Development Bank. Myanmar 1990: Country Presentation by the Government of the
Union of Myanmar 11 (U.N. Conference on Least Developed Countries, Paris, Sep 3-14, 1990).
115. Myanmar Government Makes Supplementary Budget, Xinhua News Service (Mar 21,
1991).
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lion. 11 6 Government-supported debt-for-nature exchanges could retire a
large portion of Myanmar's debt if the political and diplomatic obstacles
were removed.
To implement debt-for-nature exchanges through the AID, however,
the Myanmar government would have to support conservation and be
ready to cooperate under a long-term plan and prepare enforcement
measures. Otherwise, the AID could not support an exchange.11
SLORC appears unsuited for cooperating in an exchange; relations
between the United States and Myanmar must substantially improve
before this approach can be viable.
The Thai government would be a better candidate for a debt-for-
nature exchange; relations are warmer and contacts with the West are
stronger. An arrangement with the Thai government could raise funds to
develop cost-effective, ecologically sound logging techniques.
C. Direct Technical Assistance
The International Forestry Cooperation Act of 1990118 authorizes
the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture to provide technological support to for-
eign countries to improve forestry technology, conserve and manage for-
est land, rehabilitate cutover areas, use forest resources more efficiently,
and protect habitat. This support is available to countries that receive
assistance from the AID. 1 9
Because the AID currently provides no assistance to Myanmar,
120
there is little chance for the United States to provide direct aid for refores-
tation or improving forestry techniques. However, Thailand receives
AID assistance and hosts an AID office.12 1 The AID could ask the
Department of Agriculture to help Thailand improve harvest techniques
in Thailand's timber industry. However, if the new harvest methods are
not more profitable than clear-cutting, the timber companies will refuse to.
adopt them. Since the terms of the timber concessions require Thai com-
116. Burma's Economy to Grow, Def & For Aff Wkly 3 (Apr 10, 1989). Compare the $200
million service payments with the $100 million Myanmar received in 1989 for timber concessions
(see note 32 and accompanying text). Debt forgiveness could provide greater economic gain than
timber sales.
117. 22 USC § 2284.
118. International Forestry Cooperation Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-513, §§ 601-607, 104
Stat 2070, codified at 16 USCA §§ 4501-05 (Supp 1991).
119. Id at § 602(c). 16 USCA § 4501(c) (Supp 1991).
120. 22 CFR § 215, Appendix A (1991).
121. Id.
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panies to build roads capable of accommodating military vehicles,12 2
clear-cutting is a naturally appealing alternative; a network of roads that
will transport heavy equipment strongly encourages large-scale industrial
logging.
D. The Need for Enforcement
Regardless of what steps are taken to encourage forest protection and
develop sustainable forest industries, the United States would need to
ensure proper implementation of the new policies. Any policy that failed
to address the economic realities of a developing nation (i.e., landless poor
and economic pressures to exploit resources for maximum immediate
profit) would be difficult to enforce and would almost certainly fail. "Pro-
tected" forest areas would be open to poachers and slash-and-burn farm-
ers if not guarded. Trade restrictions would be useless without sufficient
customs expertise and personnel. Debt-for-nature exchange agreements,
if not monitored, could create unprotected "paper parks." Sustainable
resource management techniques would probably be ignored without suf-
ficient debt relief and development aid. A well-planned forest protection
plan would thus be little more than an intellectual exercise without proper
mechanisms to ensure compliance.
CONCLUSION
Deforestation in Myanmar is a serious problem. Uncontrolled tim-
ber harvest continues to transform large areas of the southeastern
Myanmar rain forest into barren clearings. Recent timber operations are
generating short-term profits at the cost of Myanmar's long-term eco-
nomic growth potential. Deforestation also causes severe environmental
disruption in Myanmar and contributes to global biodiversity loss.
The United States needs a comprehensive strategy to influence
Myanmar to halt its deforestation policies. The United States should take
steps to improve diplomatic relations with SLORC. SLORC's stubborn
resistance to external influence makes improved relations an essential pre-
cursor to effective action.
The United States should also offer Myanmar substantial foreign aid
under stringent conditions. As detailed above, SLORC not only receives
income from teak sales for its military, but gains significant military bene-
fits from the clearing of forest and the construction of timber roads in the
122. A Border Lined With Gold, Economist 31 (Apr 6, 1991).
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Karen-occupied area. A cessation of hostilities will be needed to halt
deforestation in the region. Therefore, the U.S. should condition a por-
tion of its aid on peace negotiations and an armistice with the Karen.
Although the United States could fund and facilitate the negotiations,
they should remain under the control of SLORC and the Karen
leadership.
Additional aid should be contingent on human rights reforms and a
halt to deforestation throughout Myanmar. Generally, improving eco-
nomic uses of the forest would provide the best incentive to discontinue
policies that promote deforestation.
The United States should consider economic sanctions only after
other avenues of change have been foreclosed, and only if Myanmar's
other trading partners agree to cooperate in an embargo. Sanctions would
probably increase Myanmar's perceived need to sell its natural resources
to gain foreign currency, while building resentment and resistance to U.S.
policy goals.
The United States should act quickly. Each day sees the destruction
of several thousand acres of Myanmar's rain forest, the loss of a cornuco-
pia of potential wealth for Myanmar's poor, and the disappearance of a
unique and irreplaceable habitat for known and unknown species that
may someday prove a priceless resource to all humanity.
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